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MEYER’S THEORY OF THE PSYCHOGENIC ORIGIN OF
DEMENTIA PRICOX. A CRITICISM.*
By E. STANLEY ABBOT, M. D.,
Assistant Physician, McLean Hospital, Waverley, Mass.
In the various articles and reviews which Dr. Meyer has written
relative to the subject of dementia prcox and in which he has
developed his “dynamic interpretation” or “conception,” besides
undertaking to show that the disorder may be described in terms
of deterioration of habits, conflicts of instincts and faulty adjust-
ments, he has said many things that can only be interpreted to
indicate a theory of the psychogenic origin of the disease itself, as
distinguished from its manifestations or symptoms.
It is especially this part of his “dynamic conception” of which
I wish to speak tonight, though I have also a few words to say
of that part of his “interpretation” which deals with causes.
I was led to examine his views carefully because of his effort
to approach the subject from the biological point of view, which I
believe to be the most scientific and fruitful one.
I would call attention to the facts that in some of his ideas
he runs counter to the prevailing conceptions of dementia prcox,
and that he lays especial emphasis, rightly, on the need of sufficient
observation of cases.
Stated as briefly and concisely as possible his psychogenic theory
is as follows:
Dementia prsecox is a disorder which is manifested by certain
types of reaction which are almost pathognomonic. These types
of reaction are the inevitable and natural development from a
deterioration of certain habits, and this deterioration is due, partly
to developmental defects of the mental endowment, but in part at
least, to a clashing of instincts and to progressively faulty modes
of meeting difficulties.1 In sufficiently well-observed cases, one
invariably finds that before the disorder appeared the patient had
* Read before the New York Psychiatrical Society, May 3, 1911.
1 Psychological Clinic, Vol. 2, p. 92.
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abnormal ways of dealing with the situations of life, showed an
inability to get square with events, and had a tendency toward
false adjustments.
It follows logically that only certain personalities can get demen-
tia prsecox. Meyer does not himself directly draw this conclusion
though he implies it ; $ but he allows Hoch’ to state it, without pro-
test so far as I have been able to discover.
The constitutional make-up which may lead to deterioration is
as follows:
Perhaps exemplary childhood, but exemplary under an inade-
quate ideal (goody-goody); goodness and meekness rather than
strength and determination; goodness in order to avoid fights and
struggles; later, interest in religion, but in the ceremonial forms
rather than in the essence; immature philosophizing; day dream-
ing; moralizing about others; irritability at home; deficient judg-
ment; deficient ethical control; unsteadiness of occupation;
inefficiency; especially loss of directive energy and initiative, with-
out obvious cause (such as illness); disconnected thoughts; un-
accountable whims; seclusiveness; sensitiveness to allusions to
health, pleasures, etc.; hypochondriacal complaints regarding the
heart, etc.; headaches, freaky appetite, general malaise, and other
physical symptoms. Often there are precocious abnormal sexual
practices. Some of those traits may not appear till puberty, and all
may be transient.’
Such organic changes, or evidences of toxsemia as may be found,
Meyer regards as incidental, and secondary to, perhaps even caused
by, these conflicts of instincts, deteriorations of habits, and inade-
quate psycho-biological adjustments;’ they are not a cause of
these manifestations, though they may be of some of the later
symptoms.
Thus Meyer’s conception of dementia prcox is essentially a
functional one, and in his advocacy of his psychogenetic theory he
inveighs rather strongly against those who regard the condition
as possibly or probably having some toxic or organic process back
‘Jour. of Nervous and Mental Diseases, Vol. 34, p. 332.
$ Am. Jour. Psychology, Vol. 21, p. 395.
‘Rev, of Neurol. and Psychiat., Vol. 8, p. 465.
‘Am. Jour. Psychology, Vol. ‘4, p. 102.
‘Jour. Abnorm. Psychology, Vol. 5, pp. 276, 280.
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of it, or who apply to it the “paradigm of general paralysis.” He
thus stands practically alone, and reverses the general tendency
of medical science to take morbid conditions out of the functional
class and put them into the organic. It seems like a step backward,
and his evidence should be very strong in order to be convincing.
This is especially true since we see many conditions in which
conflicting instincts and ineffective or even harmful adjustments
do not lead to deterioration. For example, reactions which can
be described in such terms as he uses occur often in hysteria,
neurasthenia, psychasthenia, hypochondriasis, feeble-mindedness,
dense ignorance, among the superstitious, among those who segre-
gate themselves in monasteries and nunneries, among those of the
so-called artistic temperament, not to mention such mental diseases
as manic-depressive psychosis. Also we find in a large percentage
of all persons, sane as well as insane, some of the traits which he
has described as belonging to the make-up which may lead to
deterioration.
Hence he should show conclusively by his cases, not that the
pre-psychotic make-up manifested all of the traits or habits indi-
cated, but enough of them to dominate the personality. His cases
should also show the dementia prcox reactions to be the evident
consequences of the special clashing of instincts and progressively
faulty modes of meeting difficulties manifested habitually by the
patient before the psychosis developed.
It is not sufficient to show that the patient had such and such
traits, and afterward had a typical dementia prcox.
Do his reported cases meet these requirements?
Of his most fully reported cases, ten appear in some detail in
three different papers; four of these give quite inadequate details
as to make-up. For example,’ a young man, said to have mastur-
bated early and to have been bright at school and in his early
environment, goes to New York from the South at 22. He then
failed to make friends, became morose, morbid, seclusive, lost
his position, sought quack treatment for sexual neurasthenia.
About two years of such behavior culminated in a tantrum, ideas
of influence, later idleness, seclusiveness, then negativistic stupor.
In this case almost nothing is said of the constitutional make-up;
Am. Jour. Psychology, Vol. 21, p. 396.
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a comparatively sudden change of reaction-type appeared coinci-
dent with a change in environment, this change in behavior mark-
ing the beginning of the psychosis. It is not shown that the
morbid reactions are the natural evolutions of previous traits. It
is evident that some other cause than make-up must be looked for
to explain the psychosis.
Of the remaining six cases, three are derived from Hoch’s ma-
terial,’ and are not inconsistent with the theory. But on the other
hand, neither they nor the other cases cited, exclude the possibility
or even probability of there being some other factor or factors at
work also.
The other three cases are his own. The time limit does not
permit a discussion of each one, but it may fairly be said that only
a few of the reaction-types described in the developed psychosis
are the logical evolution of the traits described in the make-up.
One case in point may be referred to.
A woman of 33 or over, married at 23,’ is described as rather
perverse and stubborn, with outbursts of temper as a child, efficient
as dressmaker, and later as wife and housekeeper, of strong mater-
nal instincts, but sterile, and very jealous of her husband, a rather
inferior man. After unsuccessful operations to correct sterility,
being run down from a septic finger, and being told she could never
have children, she was much upset, later developed delusions of
multiple pregnancies, of being operated on, of conspiracy, of her
husband’s unfaithfulness, and later of grandeur and high rank,
with elaborate systematizations. She continued industrious,
orderly and coherent. Here the reactions are determinated in their
outward aspect chiefly by experiences (sterility, operations, dis-
appointments) rather than by make-up (stubbornness, perversity,
jealousy, efficiency). Habitual faulty adjustments, deteriorations
of habits, conflicts of instincts cannot be considered the cause,
much less the sole cause, of a change in reaction-type coming on
first at the age of 33. Again some other cause or causes must
be looked for.
In his discussion of this as of his other cases, Meyer shows
constantly a tendency to confine his attention largely to the psy-
$ Psychol. Clinic, Vol. 2, pp. 99-100.
‘Am. Jour. Psychology, Vol. 2!, p. 391.
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chical elements, even leaning toward a Freudian manner of inter-
pretation, and to rather overlook the physical elements. He thus
takes really a psycho-biological attitude towards the problem, and
not a broadly biological one (which includes the other).
Thus it is seen that his own cases fail to show the causal relation
between the make-up and the reaction-types in dementia prsecox
that his theory calls for.
Furthermore there are many cases of dementia pnecox, well
observed, in whose antecedents no such predominating character-
istics were present. An example is that of a boy of 21, college
student, of good heredity, a good student, fond of athletics, as
much a leader as led, not a dreamer, interested in external things,
not introspective, fond of society, efficient, captain of his school
regiment, popular, ready to take responsibility, meeting emergen-
cies easily and well, normally but not morbidly interested in church
work, secretary of his Sunday School organization, considerate of
others, manly and direct, in no way peculiar; had grippe, became
depressed, then became blocked, had sudden amnesias, feeling that
he couldn’t remember, then wandered off, had scattered thinking,
typical catatonia, mutism, flexibility, etc., and grew much
demented.
Thus it is not true that where all the facts are available one
invriahly finds in the antecedents abnormal ways of dealing with
the situations of life.
While it is an interesting and possibly significant fact (though
of what it is significant we do not yet know) that in the personality
of dementia prcox cases before the onset of the illness, such traits
are found in a somewhat larger precentage than in manic-depres-
sive cases, for example, yet the proportion is not so great as to
make it a fair inference that more careful inquiry would show
them in all cases.
Also, analysis of Meyer’s own cases, so far as the facts are
available, shows that even when such dominating traits are pres-
ent, it is not necessarily those traits that determine the morbid
reactions, though naturally they would be found to determine some
of them.
To sum up, Meyer takes a psycho-biological, not broadly bio-
logical view-point.
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More than half his own most fully cited cases are inadequately
reported (though they may have been well-observed).
His own cases fail to demonstrate
. That the antecedents invariably show inefficient habits of
adjustment; and
2. That the reaction-types shown in the developed psychosis
are the necessary developments of the make-up; and they do
demonstrate
3. That, when present, the traits do not necessarily determine
the reaction-types of the developed psychosis.
Cases are too frequent in which in the pre-psychotic stage no
morbid traits dominate the personality, to render it likely that
further studies will show them to be an insignificant proportion
of all cases.
Hence his evidence is not strong enough to carry the conviction
that we should give up the organic conception in favor of the
functional.
More than this, he has not shown that organic changes of some
sort may not be the causes, or among the causes, of the origin of
the psychosis. We all admit that such have not been proved or
found, though to most of us it seems probable that in time they will
be; and we shall keep on looking for them. For Meyer’s develop-
mental theory, while possibly accounting in part for some of the
insidiously arising and slowly progressing cases of the hebephrenic
type, does not explain the rather sudden and marked changes
in behavior in almost all other cases, and does not completely ex-
plain even them.
If, then, Meyer has not fully upheld his theses that certain
personalities lead to dementia and that only certain personalities
can get dementia prcox, he has nevertheless pointed out and em-
phasized the derivation of certain reactions from past experiences.
Though not always keeping clearly in mind the distinction between
constitution and experiences, he has rightly insisted on seeking as
complete knowledge as possible of both, since they are essential,
if not to diagnosis at least to the most helpful treatment.
A few words as to his dynamic conception:
It should be noted that he does not believe in a disease entity,
but seems to regard dementia pnecox as a sum, or collocation in
one individual, of certain types of reaction, or kinds of behavior.
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It is precisely because he has turned away from the disease
concept-the “paradigm of general paralysis “-that he has felt
the necessity of explaining on constitutional or habit grounds why
these special types of reaction are grouped so often in certain
cases, and that he has had to invent this psychogenic theory which
his own reported cases fail to support.
It is also precisely because he has turned away from the disease
concept that the individual reaction-type rather than the whole
psychosis, assumes so great an importance in his eyes, and that
he turns to psychic causes alone for his explanation of it.
I would not be misunderstood as attaching no value to mental
factors. Far from it. I am a firm believer in the dynamic value
of psychic factors in the reactions of all individuals, well or ill.
But they are not the only factors, nor do they always or completely
explain the changes of reaction-type, whether of degree or of kind,
which we see in all mental disorders. By keeping to the conception
of a disease entity, with open mind as to what “may be back of
it” till demonstration has become conclusive, we shall avoid the
danger of overlooking important factors which may have causal
value in the production of mental diseases.
A comprehensive dynamic conception based on broad biological
grounds would regard each act of the individual as what one
might call the resultant of a parallelogram of forces, or rather of
a system of parallelograms or a polygon of forces. Our problems
are to discover all of these forces that we can. Furthermore, in
comparing the acts of the patient with what his acts under similar
conditions would have been had he been well (which is the only
true criterion for that patient), we will find that some forces are
lacking that normally would have entered into the resultant act.
In cases of dementia prsecox, almost more important than the
forces that are present, are the forces which ought to be there but
are not, in the production of the reaction-types. Important prob-
lems therefore are, what forces are absent, and why are they
absent?
In seeking for the answers we cannot safely ignore the brain,
without which no psychical activity whatever is possible. The
anatomy and physiology, let alone the chemistry, of the brain are
still too little known to help us much with its pathology. Yet we
do know something of these, and the fact that we do not know
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more need not deter us from suspecting and searching for some
deviation from the normal, especially some destruction, when we
note clinically certain permanent absences of psychical activity
which is normally present. The hypothetical or a priori grounds
for positing psychical mal-adjustments as causes of destructive
brain-changes are far less tenable than those of the reverse
proposition.
In turning away then from the “paradigm of general paralysis,”
Meyer loses something of value, and turns his back to certain
avenues of investigation. It is well known that the brain-changes
in general paralysis do not account for all the reactions of the
paretic-his euphoria, his grandiose ideas, his elisions of letters
and words in writing, etc. It should be equally obvious that the
organic changes back of it, whatever they may be, do not account
for all the reactions of the dementia prcox case. But since in
the latter case the organic changes are less destructive, even more
reactions will be determined by other causes-some by the factors
which Meyer rightly insists on (make-up, instincts, habits and
experiences) but others also by the environment, past and present,
and by the patient’s comprehension of it; by his general capacity;
by his aims, ambitions and purposes; by his education and training.
We must remember that causes are multiple, and so we need to
search diligently, not only in the directions Meyer has indicated,
but in these others, including all possible organic changes, as well.
If he has laid too much stress on the make-up and habitual re-
actions, it is because he has felt that others neglected them and
laid too much stress on organic processes. He has only pished
the pendulum too far to the other side, and claimed too much for
mere habit deteriorations, conflicting instincts, and false ad-
justments.
